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During the plenary sitting of 7 July 1978 the Bureau of the European 
Parliament referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs the 
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Kofoed (Doc. 235/78) pursuant to 
Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure, on restrictions of competition in the 
air transport sector. 
On 20 June 1978 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr Haase rapporteur. On 31 October 1979 it appointed Mr Schwartzenberg 
rapporteur in place of Mr Haase. 
The committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs consideJced the draft 
report at its meetings of 31 October 1978, 6 April 1979 and 23/24 January 
1980. 
At its meeting of 24 January 1980 it adopted the motion for a 
resolution by 13 votes to 9 with 5 abstentions. 
Present: Mr Delora, chairman: Mr de Ferranti, vice-chairman: 
Mr Schwartzenberg, rapporteur: Mr Beazley (deputizing for Mr Balfour), 
Mr Beumer, Mr von Bismarck, Mr Bonaccini, Mr Damseaux, Mr Delorozoy, 
Mr Fernandez, Mr Gia\8.zzi, Mr Herman (deputizing for Mr Tindemans), 
Mr Hopper, Mr Lange (deputizing for Mr Caborn), Mr J. Moreau, Sir David 
Nicolson, Mr Nyborg, Mr Petronio, Mr Purvis {deputizing for Miss Forster), 
Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Mr Rogers, Mr Sayn-Wittgenstein-Berleburg, 
Mr Schinzel, Mr Seal (deputizing for Mr Ruffolo), Mr Wagner, Mr Walter 
and Mr von Wogau. 
The opinion of the Committee on Transport is attached. 
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A 
The Corrunittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on restrictions of competition in the air transport sector 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution (Doc. 235/78) 1 , 
- having regard to the memorandum from the Corrunission to the Council con-
cerning the contributions of the European Communities to the development 
of air transport services (COM (79) 311 final), 
- having regard to the report of the Corrunittee on Economic and Moneta:cy 
Affairs and the opinion of the Corruni ttee on Transport (Doc, 1-724/79) , 
1. Notes that recent developments in air transport, principally in the 
United States and on the North Atlantic routes, are leading to 'deregulation' 
and increased competition between airlines ; notes, moreover, that, as far 
fare fixing is concerned IATA was obliged to change its structure and 
procedures to take account of those developments at the Montreal 
Conference; 
2. Points out that especially since 4 April 1974, when the court of Justice of the 
European communities ruled_that th~ provisions on competition contained 'in the 
EEC Treaty were applicable to air transport, the European Parliament has 
repeatedly called for competition policy to be extended to this sector; 
3. Approves, therefore, the principle underlying the Commission's sub-
mission of a memorandum on the development of air transport services in 
the community, which contains various proposals for measures aimed at 
increasing competition in this field and urges the Commission to work for 
a steady process of deregulation; 
4. Notes that the present organization of air transport in the Community, 
which is based primarily on bilateral agreements concluded between the 
airlines of the Member States, has the general effect of paralysing the 
market and producing a fare system that lacks transparency and is too 
costly, whereas the objective should be accessibility to rapid and cheap 
air transport; 
1Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Kofoed (see Annex) 
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5. Emphasizes that the comparatively wide freedom enjoyed by the airline 
companies in the various Member States and the United States provides 
greater choice for users and has resulted in considerably lower fares; 
the prime moveIEin this development have been the independent operators: 
6. Feels that efforts must be made to bring about a real increase in 
competition in air transport in the community, which will benefit users, 
while promoting the productivity and competitiveness of the airlines and 
the economy of the Community as a whole; 
7. Hopes that access to the scheduled air transport market in the 
Community will be liberalized, so that airlines already designated or 
new airlines may freely offer new services or lower fares and benefit, 
subject to certain safeguards specified in the memorandum, from protected 
traffic rights, if necessary over a period of years; 
8. Hopes also that access to the market for non-scheduled carriers will be 
be liberalized and that, in particular, the field' covered by the agreement 
concluded by the European Civil Aviation Conference will be extended and 
that the State of destination will automatically accept certain categories 
of service such as the package tours operated by charter companies; 
9. Emphasizes that, in the interests of users, the fare structure should 
be simplified and made more transparent; 
10. ~pproves the proposals in the Commission's memorandum for making the 
fare structure generally more flexible, for example through: 
the introduction of special rates on condition that the fare is paid in 
advance, 
- the introduction of an off-season rate, 
the introduction of a ticket covering the journey alone, without 
additional services, 
the creation of a European round-trip ticket, 
- the general application of standby rates; 
11. Takes the view that the following measures should be immediately adopted 
for the benefit of charter aircraft with a view to remedying the unfair 
conditions of competition under which the independent operators are 
working: 
- relaxation of restrictions of a geographical nature or relating to 
frequency of operations, 
relaxation of requirements concerning the size of groups, reservations 
and payment in advance, 









equal rights for scheduled airlines in respect of the simultaneous 
carriage of freight and mail, 
authorization for the sale of a specific number of seats in the air-
craft irrespective of additional requirements concerning length of 
stay, flight booking, payment for hotel accommodation, etc.; 
12. Recommends that the Commission should endeavour to find ways of 
eliminating technical and administrative barriers to air transport 
operations, which are a source of additional costs and distortions of 
competition; 
13. Considers that any extension of the rules on competition to the air 
transport sector must be a gradual and judicious process and that, to 
avoid the risk of undermining the competitiveness of air transport on the 
community and intercontinental markets, the companies should be given 
sufficient but strictly defined time in which to make the necessary 
adjustments: 
14. urges the commission to institute a system of full transparency of airline 
finances and statistics, especially with regard to route profitability: 
15. Insists that, for the purpose of exercising control over State aid, 
account must be taken of abnormal costs which are directly related to the 
operation of routes provided by airline companies in the public interest: 
16. calls upon the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, to adopt as 
qufckly as possible, in accordance with Article 87 of the EEC Treaty, the 
implementing regulation it needs if it is to act more effectively than 
it can on the basis of Article 89 of the Treaty and ensure the correct 
application of the rules of competition to the airline companies, 
irrespective of their own legal arrangements; 
17. Urges the Commission to evaluate the implications and benefits of moving 
towards a common air space and common route licensing policy, on the basis 
of freedom of supply throughout the Community; 
18. Notes that a comparison between the tariffs of the European airline companies 
and those applied in the United States must, to be fair, take account of 
the specific geographical, social, ecological and energy constraints 
peculiar to the European Community; 
19. Accepts that the necessary moves towards deregulation and increased 
competition should not cause a disruption of air transport services which 
would be prejudicial to users and to the European and international 
community as a whole; notes in this connection, the vital role that IATA 
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can play in the efforts to obtain an equitable multilateralization of 
relations between the parties involved in the air transport industry; 
20. Emphasizes that an increase in competition must not, in particular, 
have the effect of lowering the quality of the services provided or of 
eroding the social rights of airline personnel, but, on the contrary, 
if it is to be acceptable, must remain compatible with maximum protection 
of users and of the environment, air transport safety and the future of 
company employees; 
21. Stresses, finally, that, in view of the complexity of the interests 
at stake, efforts to increase competition in the air transport industry 
must, if they are to be fully successful, form part of an overall 
Community policy for air transport and for transport in general; 
22. Calls upon the Commission to pursue energetically the objectives it 
has set itself in the memorandum and to keep the European Parliament 
informed of its progress, so that it may take an active and vigilant part 
in what is essentially a European task1 
23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
commission and to the parliaments of the Member States. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. In its judgment of 4 April 1974 in Case 167/73 the Court of Justice 
expressly laid down that, although, under Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty, 
air and sea transport is excluded from the rules relating to the common 
transport policy so long as the Council has not decided otherwise, it remains, 
on the same basis as other modes of transport, subject to the general rules 
of that Treaty. It follows that Articles 85 to 90 in particular, which lay 
down the rules governing competition between undertakings, are applicable 
to sea and air transport. 
2. Since this judgment was handed down the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs has regularly asked, at the time of the annual review of 
the report on competition policy, that the Commission submit suitable 
proposals, in particular with regard to the air transport sector, and see 
to it that the competition rules are properly applied. 
3. The unsatisfactory operation of air transport services in the European 
Community has more than once been the subject of debate in Parliament, for 
example prior to adoption of the resolutions of 6 July 1978 and 13 October 
1978. The problem has now become urgent and the Commission's memorandum on 
the development of air traffic services (COM(79) 311 final), forwarded to 
the Council on 12 July 1979, has long been awaited. This report covers a 
broad range of subjects since, in addition to the inherently complicated 
problems of competition, it deals with industrial policy, transport policy, 
and matters of regional economic development and commercial policy. 
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR 
4. A striking feature of the Community air transport sector is its lack of 
flexibility, both in market terms and as regards its system of tariffs. 
This contrasts with present developments in the United States, where a 
process of 'deregulation' is taking place in the sector in question. A 
total 'deregulation• 1 in terms of traffic rights, tariffs and capacity has 
been achieved in the freight sector and substantial progress along the same 
lines has already been made in the passenger transport sector. Both within 
IATA and the Community the establishment of greater freedom of competition 
is recognized as being necessary as much by users as by the airline companies 
themselves. Air transport has for too long been organized exclusively in 
accordance with the principles, established during the Chicago Convention 
11 Airline Deregulation Act' of 1978 
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shortly after the Second World War, of intergovernmental cooperation: these 
principles are no longer consistent with developments in the industry, which 
call for a greater measure of competition. 
5. The motion for a resolution tabled by Mr KOFOED (Doc. 235/78), which 
underlies the present report, refers specifically to the problem of 
restrictions of competition in the air transport sector. Consequently, we 
shall first analyse - as briefly as possible, since the matter has already 
been frequently debated by Parliament - the nature and the effects of the 
factors restricting competition. In the light of this analysis, we shall 
draw up, primarily on the basis of the points raised in the Commission's 
memorandum, a number of proposals for remedying the situation and helping 
to bring about an improvement in the operation of air transport services 
in the Community. 
(a) Nature_of_the_restrictions_of_comeetition_in_air_transeort_in_the 
Communitl 
- Inflexibility of the market 
6. Despite some improvement in recent years, competition in the Community's 
air transport industry is still often partial, not to say inadequate, in 
certain sectors and on certain routes. 
Moreover, the structure of the air tranport market varies very con-
siderably according to the type of transport considered and depending on 
whether flights are on domestic, international or intercontinental runs. 
In the case of domestic air transport, competition exists only between 
the various types of transport available: road, rail, air, air taxi and sea 
transport. For the carriage of freight, rail and road transport have a 
decided competitive edge. Scheduled air services are normally operated by 
a single carrier: in most cases a national carrier is given the overall 
concession and the smaller carriers operate with its permission. 
There is no competition between scheduled companies in intra-Community 
air transport since the tariffs are mostly negotiated by the companies and 
are approved or imposed by the governments. Competition between scheduled 
airlines and charter operators exists only on the longer routes and on the 
holiday travel market and, even then, tends to be confined to the services 
offered, i.e. types of aircraft, frequency of flights, etc. 
Finally, on the intercontinental network, there is competition between 
the scheduled airlines and the charter operators, especially since the 
implementation of the American 'deregulation' policy. Thus, for example, 
Laker Airways has been granted the right to charge'reduced fares for its 
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service between New York and London. Nearly thirty airlines are at present 
competing on the North Atlantic market. 
It is mainly within the Community itself that the absence of competition 
is most noticeable. This is due to the existence of 'concerted monopolies' 
between the national airlines. The inflexibility of the market, organized as 
it is on the basis of bilateral agreements, has resulted in the creation of 
countless single-destination routes, whereas in the United States, for 
example, airlines find it far easier to create a network linking up a variety 
of cities in different States. As a result, the aircraft utilization rate 
in the United States is far higher than in the Community. In general, 
competition on the various routes is also appreciably reduced by the bi-
lateral agreements concluded within the Community. 
- Fare structure 
7. The fare structure in the Community's air transport industry is equally 
unsatisfactory. The most striking feature of this structure is its excessive 
complexity. 
In its opinion, the Committee on Transport calls attention to the 
immense complexity of the present structure of air fares and reports that 
British Airways alone stopped counting its different types of fare at 1,000 
and has, for example, 60 types of excursion and 10 distinct ways of 
calculating the length of stay1 
Such a complex system is expensive to operate and stands in the way of 
price transparency. The problem is compounded by the practice of manipulating 
exhange rates when the rates approved or imposed by the governments are not 
brought up to date and into line with the exchange rates applicable on the 
market. 
However, the main problem is that air fares in the Community are too 
high. If,. moreover, a comparison is made between fares charged within the 
Community and those charged outside, anomalies of one sort or another often 
come to light. One such anomaly, to which Mr MOORHOUSE recently drew 
attention in the House, is that it is almost as economical to fly from 
London to Copenhagen via New York2 • 
1
opinion drawn up by Mr CORRIE on behalf of the Committee on Transport -
point 2 
2sitting of 23 October 1979 - Debate on the report by Mr SEEFELD (Doc.1-341/79). 
See also point 2 of Mr CORRIE's opinion~ 'it ;i., only marginally more 
expensive to fly from London to Copenhagen via New York rather than 
directly'. 
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(b) The_effects_of_restrictions_of_comeetition 
8. The restrictions of competition affecting air transport in the Community 
are detriMental both to users and to the Community as a whole. The excessively 
high fares charged by the scheduled airlines place a strain on the European 
economy and hinder the development of trade within the Community, even though 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome specifies that one of the general objectives 
of the European Community must be 'to promote closer relations between the 
States belonging to it'. The maintenance of certain national barriers on the 
basis of the bilateral agreements reduces the scope for introducing new 
tariffs and types of service and for creating new routes. The Community needs 
an air transport industry that is both competitive and responsive to the 
requirements of increased economic integration. 
The absence of competition quite obviously affects the customer. Hence, 
the necessary reduction of air fares in Europe must be aimed at a democrat-
ization of air transport services, which would then become genuinely accessible 
to everyone. With the present fare structure, the ordinary, uninformed, 
pass nger is all too often penalized through being unaware of information 
that might enable him to make very substantial savings. In its opinion, the 
Committee on Transport also notes that 60% of air passengers are subsidizing 
the remaining 40%1 • 
Finally, with the regulations being as they are at present and with fare 
levels being entirely under government control, it is difficult for the 
Commission, which is not vested with the requisite legal powers, to intervene 
in the event of infringements of the rules on competition. 
The memorandum on the development of air transport services reflects the 
Commission's desire to see to the adoption of certain measures that would make 
for greater competitiveness in the Community's air transport industry. It is 
on the basis of this document and of the many proposals it puts forward that 
we shall now study the means of stimulating competition and the rules to 
which such competition should be made subject. This problem has become 
urgent and the Community has no choice but to respond to the developaents 
that have taken place in the world about it as for instance the 'deregulation' 
measures in the United States, the increased competition on the North Atlantic 
and the IATA decision at the Conference of Montreal to ~uthorize its members 
to liberalize their fare structures. Lak~Airways and British Caledonian have 
recently pressed vigorously for authorization to open up new routes and to 
create new services in the Community. It is essential for the initiatives 
already taken by certain companies and the changes to be made on the air 
transport market to be integrated forthwith into as coherent a policy as 
possible. 
1
opinion drawn up Mr CORRIE on behalf of the Committee on Transport -
point 14 
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II. MEANS OF STIMULATING CX>MPETITION 
9. While total liberalization of the conditions of access to the market 
can only be a long-term objective, measures aimed at progressive liberal-
ization could perhaps be introduced now. The end result of opening up the 
markets in this way should be an improvement in services and a reduction in 
fares. It seems necessary, in this connection, to draw a distinction between 
scheduled and non-scheduled services: 
scheduled air services 
As the Commission suggests in its memorandum, an airline company 
should be able to apply for the grant of traffic rights with a 
view to opening an intra-Community route, operating a new type of 
scheduled service or providing a new service on an existing route 
at a substantially lower fare, unless the designated airlines 
agree to offer a similar service or fare. 
It could also be agreed to relax the rules governing the operation 
of scheduled services under the bilateral agreements. Thus, for 
example, there could be an arrangement whereby the offer of an 
airline company to operate a new route or to provide a new type 
of service may not, after a period of consultation, be rejected 
by the countries of destination. 
Such liberalization measures would have to be applied gradually 
and with due caution. If the Community were suddenly to introduce 
widespread competition without taking the necessary precautions, 
it would in all likelihood be faced with serious disruptions, and 
the customer would be the first to suffer. Consequently, the 
criteria recommended in the memorandum should be approved. Thus, 
a new carrier should be required to furnish proof of the profit-
ability of his new operation and the authorities issuing licences 
should be required to satisfy themselves that the airlines have 
the resources needed to cope with an expansion of their activities. 
Moreover, the tariff reductions justifying access to the market 
would have to exceed a certain minimum amount. 
These precautions could be accompanied by protection measures. 
Thus, a limit could be placed on the number of new traffic rights 
that a carrier could obtain each year and these rights could be 
protected for a limited number of years. Though it is not spelt 
out in the memorandum, steps would have 'to be taken to ensure that 
the grant of these licences and the appl:ication of the above-
mentioned criteria do not give rise to distortions of competition. 
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non-scheduled air services 
The procedures for authorizing non-scheduled intra-Community air 
services should be made more flexible in the interests of the 
consumer, who would then benefit from a wider range of services 
and, more importantly, a wider range of cheap fares. The 
provisions of the ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference) 
agreement could be extended and could be improved by the automatic 
acceptance by the States of destination of at least certain types 
of service (e.g. the package tours operated by charter companies). 
Such automatic acceptance would not only enable the airline 
companies to plan their activities and investments better, but 
would also be to the benefit of their customers. 
(b) Makin~_the_fare_structure_more_flexible 
10. Intra--Communi ty fares are criticized for being higher than those charged 
in the United States. Certain mitigating factors must, however, be taken into 
account. A proportion of the difference between the European and American 
rates is beyond the control of carriers in the Community. Fuel costs and 
landing fees, for instance, are higher in Europe than in the United States. 
Moreover, the generally shorter distances flown in Europe mean that aircraft 
tend to take off and land more frequently. Finally, as already noted, the 
aircraft utilization rate is much reduced and transport costs are pushed up 
by the conditions under which air services must operate in Europe under the 
bilateral agreements. Fare levels in the Community are also influenced, and 
quite rightly so, by social, environmental and safety considerations. 
Notwithstanding these factors, a more flexible fare structure is 
essential. Admittedly, there is a great variety of fares on offer and such 
variety is desirable to suit the needs and the pockets of the different 
categories of users. However, while there is an abundance of fares on certain 
routes, on others the choice is extremely limited. As a general principle, 
it is necessary to introduce a far wider range of cheap fares within the 
Community. 1~e following are some of the measures which would make for a 
more flexible fare structure: 
the introduction of special tariffs on 9ondition that the fare is 
paid in advance, 
- the introduction of an off-season tariff, 
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the introduction of a ticket covering the journey alone, without 
additional services, 
- the creation of a European round-trip ticket, 
- the general application of standby tariffs. 
(c) ~~-~!!~!~~~!~~-~~-~~~~~!~~!_and_adrninistrative_barriers_to_air 
~;:~!:~12~;:~ 
11. The list of priority objectives adopted by the Council in June 1978 
include: the establishment of common rules to restrict the emission of 
pollutants by aircraft, the application of uniform technical standards 
for aircraft, the mutual recognition of licences (for air crews and ground 
staff) and improvements in the working conditions of airline personnel. 
The administrative and technical differences between the regulations of the 
Member States have tended to push up costs and create distortions of 
competition. It is to be hoped. therefore, that the Commission will be 
able to ma.ke some progress towards the attainment of its objectives as soon 
as possible. 
The Commission is currently engaged on a study - primarily in connection 
with its multiannual programme for the achievement of the customs union and 
fiscal harmonization - of the means necessary to simplify the procedures 
followed with regard to the international transport of goods. It is also 
preparing measures applicable to passenger traffic. Lastly, it has proposed 
to the Council that it should consider the possibility of harmonizing tech-
nical standards for aircraft, which would help to reduce substantially air-
line development costs. 
The creation of a more flexible tariff structure and, more generally, 
the liberalization of the conditions of access to the market and elimination 
of technical barriers could well deter abuses of dominant positions, while 
encouraging the lowering of tariffs and the elimination of the obstacles 
that persist owing to the right of veto of the Member States. These, then, 
are some of the preconditions of a competitive air transport industry. 
III. PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE AIR TRANSPORT 
SECTOR 
(a) The_disadvanta2es_of_total_com12etition 
12. In its judgment of 4 April 1974 the court of Justi,ce of the European 
Communities rightly concluded that the competition·rules contained in the 
EEC Treaty apply in particular to air transport. The rules on competition 
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cannot, however, be applied immediately and without safeguards to this 
sector because of its extreme complexity. Moreover, the Community's air 
transport industry brings into play a multitude of conflicting interests: 
those of travellers, the various regions and the communities located in the 
vicinity of airports, for instance. Furthermore, as the memorandum points 
out, the state has a monopoly interest in the air transport sector, whose 
activities are closely bound up with those of the aeronautical industry. 
Finally, far from being the sole province of the Community, air transport 
services are inseparably bound up with international relations and inevitably 
affect and are affected by the multilateralization scheme which IATAcan 
play an important part in promoting. 
It is apparent,therefore, that the application of the rules on 
competition to the air transport sector calls for special procedures. To 
allow total and unbridled competition would simply jeopardize air safety, 
the future of airline personnel and the competitiveness of air transport in 
the Community. Indeed_ an excessive liberalization of the Comm.unity market 
could seriously detract from the competitive position of European carriers 
on the intercontinental market. 
(b) Prdcedures_for_increasins_comEetition_in_air_transEort 
13. The application of the rules on competition to air transport would have 
to be a flexible and progressive process. 
- exceptions to the application of the rules on competition: 
The Commission memorandum rightly points out that companies which 
are responsible for the management of services of general economic 
interest and which are unlikely to pursue an independent commercial i 
policy should be entitled to individual exemption from certain ! 
provisions that are not consistent with the customary criteria I 
applicable to the rules on competition. 
Similarly, it is highly desirable for the Commission to define - 1 
as is its declared intention - a common approach to the application i 
of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty concerning the grant of ! 
State aids, since these aids are admissible only when deemed to j 
be in the comm.on interest, i.e. when they help provide a public 
service. Public service schemes are essential, particularly insofa~ 
- I 
as they relate to regional development, to which air services can I 
make a substantial contribution. i 
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- the progressive establishment of the rules of competition: 
The introduction of greater competitiveness in the air transport 
sector will have to be a gradual process to allow the airlines 
to adjust. It is with this in mind that the memorandum recommends 
controls over the issue of air traffic licences. Furthermore, 
some time will have to elapse before the rules concerning the 
right of establishment (see Article 52 of the Treaty) can be 
implemented, even though they are directly relevant to the air 
transport sector. 
14. The Commission has repeatedly pointed out that it does not possess 
the legal instruments required to enforce compliance with the competition 
rules laid down by the Treaties. Only the transitional provision of 
Article 89 of the EEC Treaty allows the Commission to investigate, at the 
request of a Member State or on its own initiative, cases of suspected 
infringem~nt of the rules in question. However, there are no arrangements 
for penalizing and, hence, putting a rapid end to illegal practices. To 
make good this deficiency, the Commission must therefore adopt an imple-
menting regulation laying down the procedures, the decision-making powers 
and the sanctions needed to ensure compliance with the rules on competition 
applicable to air transport services. This regulation, which would apply 
to private undertakings and to those public undertakings able to pursue an 
independent commercial policy, would enable proceedings to be instituted 
in all cases of illicit agreements or abuses of a dominant position on the 
air transport markets, where the liability of the State concerned was 
not proven. 
In the case of services predominantly under State control, greater 
competition will ensue from the measures adopted with a view to opening up 
the markets and creating more flexibility in the structures of the civil 
aviation industry. 
As the commission itself makes clear, it will also have to draw up 
proposals for the coordination of State aids to air transport companies. 
It should be added that these transactions will inevitably be affected 
by the forthcoming proposal for a regulation concerning the transparency 
of financial dealings between the Member States and ppblic undertakings. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
15. It is essential to eliminate restrictions of competition in the air 
transport sector, but with the following objectives in mind: maximum protection 
of consumers, satisfactory arrangements for air crews and ground staff, who 
must be consulted, and increased productivity in the airline companies. The 
present lack of competition is not merely damaging to the interests of 
consumers; it also adversely affects the competitiveness of the air transport 
industry and the European economy as a whole. 
It will be realized that the aim of making air transport in the Community 
a more vitally competi€ive industry really calls for the implementation of a 
common air transport policy. The Member States must reach agreement on 
common objectives, for otherwise no proper basis will exist for a thorough 
appraisal for the development of air transport over the next few decades. 
This also holds true for the aircraft construction industry, since the 
placing of orders for aircraft is closely bound up with decisions relating 
to routes and capacity. 
Concurrently with the liberalization of the community market, negotiations 
would have to be held within the relevant international bodies with a view to 
protecting the interests of the community vis-a-vis third countries. community 
solutions would have to be found to problems such as the saturation of certain 
air zones and air corridors, which can be harmful to competition, or the 
establishment of landing rights. Incidental though it may seem in the present 
context, there is, finally, the crucial problem of the rising price of energy, 
which will exert an obvious influence over future decisions concerning 
transport. 
To find satisfactory solutions to these various problems, which bring 
conflicting interests to the fore, challenge established customs and compel 
close coordination by the national administrations and the Commission of their 
respective services, will be a formidable task - a task that calls for the 
utmost cooperation from the European Parliament. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 235/78) 
tabled by Mr KOFOED 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on restrictions of competition in the air transport sector 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the fact that the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 85-93 of the, EEC Treaty also apply to air transport, 
- mindful of the fact that the Commission is in the process of drawing up 
detailed rules for the aviation sector, 
having regard to complaints about restrictions of competition in favour 
of the scheduled airlines, 
1. Recognizes the need for reliable and safe scheduled air services but 
considers fares for scheduled services within the Community generally 
to be unreasonably high when compare a. for example, with the situation 
in the USA; 
2. Feels that competition is being undermined by the existence of 
innumerable differing fare schemes; 
3. Is of the opinion that, in the charter sector, government-controlled 
airline companies appear to enjoy special advantages in the matter of 
taxes, subsidies, flying concessions, etc., when compared with certain 
private aviation companies; 
4. Wishes to strengthen the links between the Member States in the field 
of transport; 
5. Notes the growing need for international travel; 
6. Opposes a situation where the losses incurred in operating the 
Atlantic routes are passed on to users of the Community's internal 
routes; 
7. Feels that, within the Community, the organizational efficiency of 
the scheduled airlines is substantially lower than in the USA; 
8. Notes with regret the absence in the Community both of a common 
aviation policy and of effective cooperation between the 
Member States in this field; 
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9. Calls for increased collaboration in the aviation industry: 
10. Requests the commission to carry out as soon as possible a survey of 
the competition situation in the aviation sector: 
11. Requests the Commission, wherever discrimination can be observed on 
the basis of existing data, to ensure equal competition between 
publicly-owned and private airlines, particularly.as regards charter 
companies: 
12. Requests the Commission to draw up as soon as possible a comprehensive 
common aviation policy: 
13. Urges the commission to help create increased opportunities for the 
establishment of skytrain services within the Community: 
14. Requests the Commission to report on its plans regarding aviation 
policy by submitting to the Council as soon as possible a communication 
on these plans and by passing this information to the European 
Parliament: 
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission 
and the council of the European Communities. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT 
Draftsman: Mr J. CORRIE 
On 31 January 1979 the COIIUllittee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning 
and Transport appointed Mr Corrie draftsman of the opinion. 
The cOIIUllittee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 27 and 
28 March 1979 and 24 April 1979 when it was adopted unanimously. 
Present: Lord Bruce of Donington, chairman (deputizing for the rapporteur, 
Mr Corrie): Mr van Aerssen (deputizing for Mr Starke), Mr Bertrand 
(deputizing for Mr Ligios), Mr Brugger, Mr Fuchs, Mr Mascagni, Mr Noe, 
Mr Normanton (deputizing for Mrs Kellett-Bowman), Mr Schyns, Mr Tolman, 
Mr Wawrzik (deputizing for Mr McDonald). 
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1. In the course of preparing this opinion, the Committee on Regional 
Policy, Regional Plannil'l3' and Transport had discussions with the following 
representatives of certain aspects of the air transport sector: Mr ERIKSEN, 
Secretary-General of the European Assembly of the International Air 
carriers Association (EURACA): Mr PUGH, Managing Director of British 
Caledonian Airways: Mr RATTIER, Vice Director-General of Air France: 
Mr WELBURN, General Manager on Tariffs and Industry Affairs, British 
Airways: and Sir Freddie LAKER of Laker Airlines. 
The draftsman would like to take this opportunity of expressing the 
gratitude of the committee to these gentlemen, whose evidence has made so 
important a contribution to this opinion. 
2. The first thing which became clear to the conunittee from the evidence w~ 
heard was the imrnense complexity of the present structure of air fares. In ) 
addition to the well-known but still startling oddities such as it being onlt 
marginally more expensive to fly from London to Copenhagen via New York 
rather than directly, the Committee learned with surprise that British 
Airways alone stopped counting its different types of tare at one thousand 
i 
and has, for example, sixty types of excursion and ten distinct ways of calc~-
lating the length of stay: in view of this, it is hardly surprising that it 
costs IATA one million dollars a year to publish their tariffs! 
3. The committee also heard interesting evidence on the historical 
evolution of civil aviation since the Second World War, and it was argued 
that from the start emphasis was placed on cooperation rather than on 
competition in the interests of restarting the industry, which of course 
was only in its infancy. IATA was set up at the invitation of national 
governments, and a regulatory system was imposed on the airlines with a 
system of bi-lateral agreements and obligations on the airlines, such as 
maintaining a high frequency of operations: A further, and very significant l 
point is that after the war the fare structure was the simplest possible, 
consisting of only one class. Since then, this single class has remained 
the base line, as it were, and the fare structure has evolved by making 
reductions of various kinds from this base until a fares structure as 
complex as that described in paragraph 2 above has come into existence. 
Whether this structure is really for the convenience of the public is open 
to question, and it is certainly difficult for the ordinary passenger to 
gain easy access to information which might save him a considerable amount 
of money. The draftsman will return to this crucial point in paragraphs 
l 
It would appear that in such bilateral agreements, detailed arrangements 
are made determining the frequency of operations, the number and types 
of aircraft, the tariffs etc. on a fifty-fifty basis between the respec-
tive airlines. 
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6 and 7 below. When it was suggested that a single fare structure would 
have considerable advantages, it was countered that there was such a wide 
range of consumers that a single simple facility would satisfy very few 
people. British Airways have, in fact, identified six main profiles of 
users with very different needs, ranging from the businessman who wants 
complete flexibility for his travel arrangements, to the grandmother who 
may have made arrangements to visit her grandchildren in another continent 
a long time in advance, and who requires cheapness rather than flexibility. 
Against this, it was pointed out by Sir Freddie Laker that only 14% of all 
air travellers book tickets less than fourteen days before departure. 
4. Naturally, in view of the terms of Mr Kofoed's motion for a resolution, 
the committee paid particular attention to the high cost of air travel in 
Europe, and the following points summarise the reasons for this as put 
forward by our witnesses. 
In the first place, as far as travel in Europe is concerned, the short 
distances, the large number of landings and take-offs, the smaller size 
of aircraft as compared with air travel in the United States mean that 
costs are bound to be far higher in Europe than they are in America. In 
additicn, the particular geopolitical situation in Europe has no relation-
ship to that of the United States; a situation that could surely be 
partially remedied within·· the Community if a genuine common air transport 
policy were created.(see paragraph 12 below). 
Secondly, it was argued that in real terms the cost of air travel in 
Europe has in fact fallen by 25% since 1965, but there was general agree-
ment that while significant economies could be affected by the use of 
wide-bodied airplanes, most European routes did not have enough passengers 
to justify their use. 
It was clear that the representatives of the regular airlines did 
not feel that any substantial reduction of European fares was possible, 
given the factors mentioned above. On the other hand, the independent 
operator, Sir Freddie Laker, stated that if he were able to operate, for 
example, on tle London-Paris route, he would be able to do so offering 
very much lower fares than those at present being ask'ed. 
5. The explanation for this disparity in the view of the representatives 
of the IATA airlines was that they feEi. obliged to offer frequent services 
and to operate uneconomic routes, and that they offer a range of services 
which are not provided by independent operat•J:t:b, who also are not obliged 
by the constraints which are imposed on the IATA operators by national 
governments. 
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6. It is at this stage that the draftsman wishes to return to the point 
touched on in paragraph 3 above, concerni!l3 the present fare structure. 
It was pointed out there that air fares are based on a certain 
price and that reductions are made from the base price according to a very 
wide range of circumstances. 
7. The Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport 
believesthat this structure is the wrong way around, and that a considerable 
improvement would be achieved by inverting it, so that the basic price was 
the lowest possible economic price per passenger kilometre, and that 
passengers who wished particular services such as booking on a certain 
flight, interchangeability of tickets, money back on tickets not used and 
so on, would pay extra for those particular services. It is significant 
that the Laker Skytrain service across the Atlantic is becoming more 
sophisticated in the services it offers, but this is on the basis of the 
passenger paying for what is extra to the basic service. The Committee 
feeE that this is altogether a more equitable system, and is, moreover, 
one which would encourage more people to make use of air travei and they 
therefore urge the regular airlines to give very serious consideration to 
the possibility of structuring their fares in this way. 
8. Even if, as the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and 
Transport believasto be the case, it would be possible to make considerable 
improvements to the present fare structure in Europe by means of a radical 
re-assessment of the way in which.it is structured, this would not in 
itself solve all the problems raised in Mr KOFOED's notion for a resolution. 
The preamble to the resolution reads: '- having regard to the fact that 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 85-93 of the EEC Treaty 
also apply to air transport'. The draftsman associates himself entirely 
with this statement, but at the same time the risks of disorder which a 
completely da:-egulated system would bring about in this sector must be 
born in mind, even if they should not be exaggerated, bearing in mind ex-
perience in the United States since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 
9. It has already been pointed out in paragraph 3 above that the basis 
of the development of international civil aviation in the post-war period 
was cooperation rather than competition; and that the pre~ent regulating 
system and the use of bilateral agreements on scheduled services are part 
of this historical development. It was suggested to us by the represen-
tative of British Caledonian Airways that widescale deregulation in 
1 According to Sir Freddie Laker, real competition between national air-
lines only exists in the meals they )ffer and the expensive prestige 
offices they have in the main streets of t~e main towns and cities. 
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Europe would in the short run result in lower fare charges, but that the 
fall in price would lead to ·a need for increased load factors which might 
not be achieved, and would necessitate government subsidies to cover the 
risk of failures by the carriers, on the abandonment, for example, of 
marginal off-peak services. In short, it was argued that the removal of 
price controls might in the long run lead to price increases. 
10. There may well be some truth in this argument, but it would need to be 
tested by experience and the Conunittee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning 
and Transport does not believe that this experience can be had without there 
being an element of real competition. While it was stated that indepen-
dent carriers, such as Sir Freddie Laker, can operate cheaper fares on 
specific routes and under specific circumstances, it was accepted that the 
regular carriers can and have in fact reacted to such competiticn. While the 
committee was given an eloquent account of the difficulties which British 
Airways experienced within IATA over a number of years before they were able 
to introduce low-cost APEX fares on the transatlantic routes in 1978, it 
is surely no coincidence that the major airlines introduced low fares very 
quickly after the Skytrain service had started, though of course factors 
such as the change of attitude of the American administration also have to 
be borne in mind. Without effective competition, the draftsman does not 
believe that the national airlines will have a sufficient inducement to 
seek means of lowering their fares. 
11. Put very simply, the case of the representatives of the airline compa-
nies which are members of IATA might be summarised as follows: the national 
airlines are charged with duties, which go far beyond that of simply making 
a profit; there has to be a high 'social content' in the services they 
offer, and this invariably means a level of air fares which has to be high 
enough to support non-economic activities, such as operating on marginal 
routes. They accept that there is plenty of room for improvement, but they 
stress that the hands of the airlines themselves are largely tied by the 
governments who are, for example, the contracting parties to bilateral 
agreements rather than the airlines themselves; on the other hand, it was 
stressed that it was the duty of the airlines to operate as profitably as 
possible in terms of the mandate they were given. Finally, change if and 
when it comes should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 
12. When the representative of the Commission asked for their reaction 
to the Conunission's proposal that a European Authority for the Regulation 
of Civil Aviation should be established in such fields as licensing and 
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the overseeing of tariffs in place of the present national authorities, 
the response of the representatives of Air France and British Caledonian 
Airways was that this was essentially a political problem, and that 
though the airlines could adapt to it, it would change neither the 
specific nature of the problems of European aviation nor the costs. This 
reaction was perhaps somewhat negative, and the committee believesthat 
real advantages could follow from a more concerted approach than exists 
at present. 
13. This is an important point because it would seem clear that a totally 
deregulated market with unlimited competition might well prove inoperable.1 
On the other hand, the present structure of the European civil aviation 
sector is undoubtedly over-regulated and suffers from lack of genuine 
competition. Quite apart from the benefit of differences of scale, the 
United States system would appear to benefit from the advantages of free 
competition. The committee believes~herefore,that a European Regulatory 
Authority in place of a number of national systems could prove of advantage, 
provided (a) that it was based on a system of free and fair competition, 
which would be subject to reasonable supervision, and (b) that part of its 
duties was to ensure an orderly market system to protect both the consumer 
and the operator. 
14. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the present system has 
many er itics, and that the public at large is not satisfied by the level 
of fares demanded. From the point of view of an independent operator who 
freely admits to being in the aviation business to make a profit, one 
answer is clear, namely that subsidies should only be paid to airlines 
at the point of need, and not on a blanket basis; in effect, it was 
suggested that 95% of passengers are at present being penalised to provide 
a social service for 5%; this figure may well be an exaggeration and it 
might be more realistic to suggest that 60% of air passengers are subsidi-
sing the remaining 40%. Air services, in this light, should not be considered 
-as social--services, though it should be accepted that for certa1.n reasons,- -
in certain cases, such as for example, the Shetland ·Is·lands or Northern 
Ireland, a very good case could be made out on both social and economic grounds 
for subsidising specific routes in the intemst of the development of a region. 
Indeed;the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport--
is convinced that there is a moral obligation on Member States to provide 
some form of subsidy for all types of transport costs if they can be shown 
to be damaging to the development of a region and if such subsidies are 
compatible with Articles 80 and 85 to 93 of the EEC Treaty. 
1 
It is however clear that even with unlimited competition there is bound 
to be a threshold below which air fares cannot· fall. The draftsman is 
however, suggesting that it is at, or near, this threshold that the ba~ic 
calculation of air fares should be made. 
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15. By and large, however, your draftsman believes that the best solution 
is to allow for a measure of competition on certain air routes; the type of 
competition permitted might vary from totally free to being subjected to 
various limitations such as offering a special type of service, operating 
at certain times and so on. This, though, should be seen as a first, 
cautious step, and ultimately a much freer type of competition should be 
envisaged, subject always to reasonable supervision. Inevitably, this will 
mean that a different type of service will be offered, and if the prices 
are very much lower, it will probably be at the price of the traditional 
range of services which the national airlines have offered. This will 
~ndoubteciiy induc-e the schedulei- air lines to look igain -at their tariffs-
and at the services they are offering, and the passenger is likely to 
benefit. 
From the evidence it has heard, the committee believes that the operators 
do in fact recognise that changes in a system that originated in the l940's 
are needed for the 1980's; some of the changes may have to be revolutionary; 
others should certainly be evolutionary, but without free competition 
change will be minimal and will come about very slowly. 
16. It is conceivable that a completely deregulated market might lead to 
a chaotic situation, but it is not necessary to have complete deregulation. 
What is needed is simplification and flexibility. The advantages of free 
competition should be in the public interest, since it is likely in the 
long run that independent operators will work routes and provide types 
of service which the national airlines are unwilling or unable to do, 
while at tl'e same time the threat of the independent operator will help 
to bring prices down to a minimum on many scheduled routes. There is 
surely room for both the national airline and the private operator, and 
competition can only be in tl'e general interest. 
17. Finally, the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and 
Transport in submitting this opinion to the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs would again draw particular attention to the need to 
give very careful consideration to the whole basis on which air fares 
are calculated as a preliminary to the other changes which will come 
about with effective competition. 
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